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No Injury? No Class: Proof of Injury in 
Federal Antitrust Class Actions 
post-Wal-Mart 
Rami Abdallah Elias Rashmawi* 
 
Abstract 
Over the past twenty years the Supreme Court of the United 
States has systematically limited the scope of federal class 
actions brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Importantly, in two landmark decisions, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, the 
Supreme Court cemented a heightened level of inquiry demanded 
by Rule 23, a stringent, “rigorous analysis.” 
This Note analyses the effects of this heightened inquiry on 
federal antitrust class actions, particularly in situations where 
the plaintiffs’ method of proving antitrust injury fails to do so for 
some of the putative class members. After the Introduction, Part 
II of this Note provides a brief overview of federal antitrust law 
and federal class action law, covering the goals and policies of 
each. Part III discusses the doctrinal effects of the landmark 
Supreme Court decisions in Wal-Mart and Comcast. Part IV 
outlines the two standards applied by federal courts in the 
pre-Wal-Mart era to assess whether an antitrust plaintiff’s 
method of proving injury met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 
Part V of this Note analyzes these two standards and argues that 
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the less stringent one did not survive the Supreme Court’s new 
post-Wal-Mart “rigorous analysis.” Part V then assesses the 
current state of a de minimis exception to the more stringent 
standard, analyzing the post-Wal-Mart federal appellate 
decisions discussing the exception. Finally, Part VI of this Note 
concludes and proposes a framework for assessing proof of 
class-wide antitrust injury to accompany the Supreme Court’s 
new more exacting class certification standards. 
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I. Introduction 
Imagine you are an average consumer (which you probably 
are). It is a normal weekday. You wake up and get out of bed. 
You brush your teeth, maybe drink a cup of coffee. Imagine that 
at some point while you prepare to begin your day, you decide to 
turn on the daily news. So, you flip to your favorite television 
channel. There, on the news, you see a report stating that the 
United States Department of Justice has opened an “antitrust 
investigation” into the manufacturer of a product that you 
purchase frequently in your day to day life. You hear that the 
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manufacturer allegedly engaged in “anticompetitive behavior” 
and that you as a consumer suffered from higher prices as a 
result. It’s possible that you hardly understand what the report 
actually means but nonetheless you think to yourself, “I 
purchase that product all the time, can I really do anything to 
get money from that company?” While the answer to that 
question may theoretically be “yes,” the challenges you must 
face to emerge victorious in your federal antitrust action may 
prove too tough to take on alone. You may need some help from 
a couple of friends, friends who also purchased the same product 
from the same company. But unfortunately, pooling resources 
can only get you so far—you will likely face other obstacles along 
the way. 
The federal antitrust laws stand as the primary protection 
for the United States free market.1 Antitrust and competition 
law allow for the proper functioning of the economy through 
prohibitions on anticompetitive behavior such as monopolies 
and cartels.2 Specifically, the main goal of the American regime 
is preventing the improper abuse of market power, which 
commonly results in increased prices and negative effects on 
consumer welfare.3 However, in order for this goal to be 
achieved, effective enforcement of the antitrust laws is key.4 
While the Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission are the primary enforcers of federal antitrust laws, 
private individuals also fulfill a crucial role in their 
 
 1. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 502 (2015) 
(“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market 
structure.”). 
 2. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963) 
(“[C]ompetition is our fundamental national economic policy, offering as it 
does the only alternative to the cartelization or governmental regimentation 
of large portions of the economy.”); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 
1, 56–57 (1911) (discussing fears that monopoly would “restrain[] the free flow 
of commerce and tend[] to bring about the evils, such as enhancement of prices, 
which were considered to be against public policy”). 
 3. See infra Part II.A (discussing the goals of the federal antitrust laws). 
 4. See Wayne D. Collins, The Goals of Antitrust: Trusts and the Origins 
of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2339–42 (2012) (recounting 
the early efforts of federal antitrust enforcement). 
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enforcement.5 Through creating a private right of action, 
Congress empowered private parties to act as “private attorneys 
general”6 and participate in antitrust enforcement.7 However, 
many issues that decrease the efficacy of this crucial 
enforcement are inherent in private antitrust actions and 
generally cannot be overcome by a litigant acting alone.8 
Federal class actions, governed by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23,9 solve some of the common issues that plague 
antitrust actions.10 This is because it is common for antitrust 
harms to be spread over a significant amount of consumers, with 
the actual harm suffered so miniscule that bringing an 
individual claim would be financially unwise.11 The class 
mechanism operates in the context of private antitrust actions 
to provide a solution to these issues; however, class certification 
is subject to important restrictions contained in Rule 23(a) and 
23(b).12 
Proving injury resulting from the alleged antitrust violation 
is an essential element of a federal antitrust action. Accordingly, 
putative class plaintiffs must put forth a mechanism at the class 
 
 5. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private 
Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 
904– 05 (2008) (listing the benefits of private antitrust enforcement). 
 6. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). 
 7. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 422 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (emphasizing 
the role of antitrust laws as a “consumer welfare prescription”); Lande & 
Davis, supra note 5, at 883 (“[P]rivate enforcement . . . serves to deter 
antitrust violations.”). 
 8. See Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 881–82 (discussing the issues 
that plague private antitrust enforcement). 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 10. See Steven B. Pet, Preserving Antitrust Class Actions: Rule 23(b)(3) 
Predominance and the Goals of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 12 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 149, 150–52 (2017) (commenting that class action antitrust 
enforcement “advances Congress’s two primary goals in passing Section 4 of 
the Clayton Act”). 
 11. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
III), 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (acknowledging the most common 
antitrust class action scenario). 
 12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“Prerequisites.”); id. 23(b) (delineating 
additional rules to maintain a class action); see also Pet, supra note 10, at 
156– 58 (discussing the benefits and restrictions the class action places on 
private antitrust plaintiffs). 
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certification stage that proves this injury.13 Importantly, this 
mechanism for proving injury must not frustrate the 
predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).14 
Historically, this mechanism for proving class-wide injury 
rarely frustrated the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).15 The 
requirements were “readily met in certain cases 
alleging . . . violations of the antitrust laws.”16 Consequently, 
many courts were willing to certify classes so long as 
“widespread injury to the class” was proven, even if some 
individual members of the putative class were found to be 
uninjured.17 
However, in the past decade, multiple Supreme Court 
decisions drastically altered the landscape of federal class action 
law and limited a putative class’ ability to achieve certification. 
Importantly, first in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,18 and 
 
 13. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (“To establish liability under [the 
Clayton Act], each plaintiff must prove not only an antitrust violation, but also 
an injury to its business or property and a causal relation between the two.”); 
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
therefor . . . .”). 
 14. See Rail Freight III, at 623–24 (“The party seeking class certification 
must affirmatively demonstrate that the commonality and predominance 
requirements are satisfied.” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 
338, 350–51 (2011))). 
 15. See Pet, supra note 10, at 156–57 (noting that “the predominance 
inquiry would only rarely bar class treatment for antitrust plaintiffs”). 
 16. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). 
 17. See Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co., 246 F.R.D. 293, 310 
(D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class 
certification where the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In 
re NW Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, 223 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(“The ‘impact’ element of an antitrust claim need not be established as to each 
and every class member; rather, it is enough if the plaintiffs’ proposed method 
of proof promises to establish ‘widespread injury to the class’ as a result of the 
defendant’s antitrust violation.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 
F.R.D. 297, 321 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“Courts have routinely observed that the 
inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class certification where 
the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In re NASDAQ Mkt. 
Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Even if it could 
be shown that some individual class members were not injured, class 
certification, nevertheless, is appropriate where the antitrust violation has 
cause widespread injury to the class.”). 
 18. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
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subsequently in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,19 the Court 
established and reaffirmed a heightened level of inquiry 
demanded by Rule 23, a stringent, “rigorous analysis.”20 
Following the principles set forth in Wal-Mart and Comcast, 
many courts have shifted away from the more lenient 
“widespread injury” standard and instituted a more stringent 
“common proof” standard instead.21 This standard requires that 
injury be shown through “common proof” as to the entire class.22 
Under the “common proof” standard, courts so far are unwilling 
to certify classes that contain a large number of uninjured 
members.23 However, these courts signal that even under this 
more stringent standard, a de minimis amount of uninjured 
class members possibly would not preclude certification.24 This 
Note addresses whether a class action seeking damages under 
federal antitrust law can be certified by a federal district court 
under Rule 23(b)(3)25 when the mechanism for proving 
class-wide injury fails to show that every single class member 
was injured by the alleged antitrust violations. 
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief 
overview of federal antitrust law and federal class action law, 
covering the goals and policies of each. Part III discusses the 
doctrinal effects of the landmark Supreme Court decisions in 
Wal-Mart and Comcast resulting in the shift towards a “rigorous 
 
 19. 569 U.S. 27 (2013). 
 20. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351 (“[C]ertification is proper only if the 
trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 
23(a) have been satisfied.”); Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33 (reiterating the “rigorous 
analysis” standard). 
 21. See e.g., In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail 
Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[P]laintiffs . . . must show 
that they can prove, through common evidence, that all class members were 
in fact injured by the alleged conspiracy.”). 
 22. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that 
the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence 
that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.”). 
 23. See infra Part V.B (analyzing courts that apply the “common proof” 
standard). 
 24. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (determining whether the de 
minimis exception would encompass a large number of uninjured class 
members). 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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analysis” at the class certification stage. Part IV outlines the 
two standards applied by courts in the pre-Wal-Mart era to 
assess whether an antitrust plaintiff’s method of proving 
class-wide injury met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Part IV 
emphasizes the differing results of each standard in regard to 
the presence of uninjured class members. 
Part V of this Note analyzes these two standards and 
argues that the less stringent of those standards did not survive 
the Supreme Court’s new post-Wal-Mart “rigorous analysis” 
approach to class certification. Part V then assesses the current 
state of a de minimis exception, recounting the post-Comcast 
appellate decisions discussing the exception. Finally, Part V 
assesses the factors that courts find applicable in finding an 
amount of uninjured class members to be de minimis. Part VI of 
this Note concludes and proposes a framework for assessing 
proof of class-wide antitrust injury to accompany the Supreme 
Court’s new more exacting class certification standards. 
II. Federal Antitrust Class Actions 
A. Federal Antitrust Law 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States 
federal government undertook to protect against the 
accumulation and improper abuse of market power.26 Beginning 
with the Sherman Act of 1890,27 and continuing through the 
Clayton Act of 1914,28 Congress continuously took steps to 
 
 26. See Collins, supra note 4, at 2339–42 (recounting the early history 
and emergence of federal antitrust and competition law); Barak Orbach, The 
Goals of Antitrust: How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 
2262 (2013) (“Senator Sherman, the drafters of the Sherman Act, and other 
lawmakers unequivocally expressed a desire to fight trusts and combinations 
through legislation.”); Rudolph J. Peritz, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: A 
Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 269–71 (1990) 
(describing the history and original principles underlying early antitrust 
regulation and enforcement); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
MARKET POWER HANDBOOK ix (2d ed. 2012) (“[A]t its core, antitrust policy is 
aimed at preventing firms from obtaining, maintaining, or utilizing market 
power.”). 
 27. 26 Stat. 209 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018)). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 
U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2018)). 
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empower the government to curtail the rise and hegemony of 
monopolies and trusts in the United States.29 
Drafted in the shadow of what was popularly known at the 
time as “ruinous,” “destructive,” or “excessive” competition,30 
the Sherman Act resolves that “[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade 
or commerce . . . is hereby declared to be illegal”31 and further 
punishes “every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce.”32 In enacting 
the prohibitions contained in the Sherman Act, “Congress 
mandated competition as the lodestar by which all must be 
guided in ordering their business affairs.”33 The Sherman Act 
stands as an essential truss in the nation’s free market 
structure.34 
While federal antitrust law draws its authority from these 
statutes, the regime established by Congress is commonly 
understood as “little more than a congressional mandate to 
 
 29. See N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman 
Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”); Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56–57 (1911) (discussing fears that 
monopoly would “restrain[] the free flow of commerce and tend[] to bring about 
the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be against 
public policy”). 
 30. See Collins, supra note 4, at 2290 (recounting anticompetitive 
behavior that existed prior to the Sherman Act). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 32. Id. § 2. 
 33. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406 (1978). 
 34. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 502 (2015) 
(“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market 
structure.”); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING 
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 4–5 (6th ed. 2014) (“Antitrust 
law . . . is a body of law that seeks to assure competitive markets through the 
interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic process of exchange . . . .”); 
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963) (“[C]ompetition is 
our fundamental national economic policy, offering as it does the only 
alternative to the cartelization or governmental regimentation of large 
portions of the economy.”); Phila. Taxi Ass’n v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 
338 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Competition is at the heart of the antitrust laws.”). 
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develop a federal common law of competition.”35 The Sherman 
Act’s natural susceptibility to common law interpretation rivals 
even that of the U.S. Constitution itself.36 Consequently, the 
Supreme Court took it upon itself at an early stage to mold the 
contours of the emerging federal competition law through 
numerous decisions interpreting the bounds of the federal 
statutes.37 For instance, although the Sherman Act’s prohibition 
on “every contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce”38 seems 
all-encompassing, the Supreme Court construes it as 
“precluding only those contracts or combinations which 
‘unreasonably’ restrain competition.”39 This construction of the 
statute became known as the “rule of reason.”40 The nature of 
the Sherman Act as an adaptable and flexible “charter of 
 
 35. Peritz, supra note 26, at 269; see Collins, supra note 4, at 2340 (“The 
appeal of the common law to the framers of the Sherman Act resided in . . . the 
fact that the law could be adjusted by the courts using the common law process 
continuously through time to cope with new, emerging business practices.”); 
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 57–58 (noting that the “trend of legislation and 
judicial decision came more and more to adapt the recognized restrictions to 
new manifestations of conduct” to best prevent “the wrongs which it had been 
the purpose to prevent from the beginning”). 
 36. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933) 
(“As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability 
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59 (“Let us consider the language 
of the first and second sections, guided by the principle that where . . . had a 
well-known meaning at common law . . . they are presumed to have been used 
in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.”); United States v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179–80 (1911) (applying the “rule of reason” to 
construe the words “restraint of trade” so as not to “destroy the individual 
right to contract and render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade 
in the channels of interstate commerce”); Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
U.S. 231, 238–39 (1918) (reading the “rule of reason” into the Sherman Act to 
determine that a restraint of trade must be unreasonable to trigger the Act). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 39. N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (quoting Bd. of 
Trade, 246 U.S. at 238). 
 40. See, e.g., Peritz, supra note 26, at 269–71 (describing the early 
disagreement between proponents of the “rule of reason” and the proponents 
of “literalism”); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) (“[I]n 
every case where it is claimed that an act or acts are in violation of the statute 
the rule of reason, in the light of the principles of law and the public policy 
which the act embodies, must be applied.”). 
 
1384 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1375 (2020) 
 
freedom”41 is one of its greatest attributes.42 Accordingly, the 
enforcement and interpretation of the federal antitrust statutes 
are subject to constant contemporary revision.43 
However, while the prohibitory sections of the Sherman Act 
took crucial steps toward empowering the federal government 
to protect the free market and specifically consumer welfare,44 
the private enforcement provisions of Section 7 of the Sherman 
Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act empowered ordinary 
individuals to participate in the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws.45 These provisions, collectively codified in 15 U.S.C.  
§ 15(a), state that “any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold 
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit.”46 Multiple 
rationales justify private enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws.47 One important goal of private enforcement is for victims 
to recoup losses sustained as a result of illegal anticompetitive 
 
 41. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). 
 42. See Collins, supra note 4, at 2340 (“The appeal of the common law to 
the framers of the Sherman Act resided in . . . the fact that the law could be 
adjusted by the courts using the common law process continuously through 
time to cope with new emerging business practices.”). 
 43. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887, 
899 (2007) (“Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and 
greater experience, so too do the Sherman Act’s prohibitions on ‘restraint[s] of 
trade’ evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”). 
 44. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 422 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (emphasizing 
that the antitrust laws are a “consumer welfare prescription”); Broadcom 
Corp. v. Qualcom, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The primary goal of 
antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare by promoting competition 
among firms.”). 
 45. See Collins, supra note 4, at 2341–42 (recounting the legislative 
discussion regarding providing “an inducement to bring what were likely to be 
expensive risky law suits”); 21 Cong. Rec. 2569 (1890) (statement of Sen. 
Sherman) (expressing concern that even double damages are “too small” to 
induce private enforcement). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018). 
 47. See Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 881–83 (discussing “the purposes 
of private enforcement and private remedies”). 
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behavior.48 Moreover, private enforcement “prevent[s] wealth 
transfers from these victims to firms with market power.”49 
Perhaps more importantly, private enforcement also serves to 
deter antitrust violations at the outset,50 despite the relatively 
few cases that actually render a judgment against the 
defendant.51 In granting a private right of action, Congress 
deputized antitrust victims to act as “private attorneys 
general,”52 crucially supplanting the enforcement efforts of the 
government by encouraging private litigation in the public 
interest.53 
To prevail on an antitrust claim, a civil antitrust plaintiff 
must establish three elements: an antitrust violation, causation, 
and impact or damage.54 Accordingly, courts analyzing antitrust 
 
 48. See Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 
(1976) (“Treble-damages antitrust class actions . . . [were] conceived of 
primarily as a remedy for the people of the United States as individuals, 
especially consumers . . . .”); Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343 (noting that the civil 
remedy provision was passed “as a means of protecting consumers from 
overcharges resulting from price fixing”). 
 49. Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 882. 
 50. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977) (recognizing 
the goal of “deterring violators and depriving them of the fruits of their 
illegality” reflected in the antitrust laws); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. 
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968) (refusing to interpret the antitrust laws to 
allow “those who violate [them] by price fixing or monopolizing [to] retain the 
fruits of their illegality because no one [would be] available who would bring 
suit against them”). 
 51. See Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 883 (“Antitrust verdicts that 
produce treble damages are rare, and we believe that few, if any, of the many 
antitrust cases that settle do so for more than single damages.”). 
 52. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). 
 53. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746 (recognizing the important 
“legislative purpose in creating a group of ‘private attorneys general’ to enforce 
the antitrust laws” (quoting Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 262)); Lande & Davis, supra 
note 5, at 905 (emphasizing that private enforcement “often 
substitute[s] . . . federal and state action entirely when the government did 
not act at all or did not achieve meaningful results” and furthermore routinely 
“complement[s] governmental enforcement in many situations”). 
 54. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 
(2d Cir. 2001) (outlining the “three required elements of an antitrust claim”); 
Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, 502 F.3d 91, 105 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (“The three required elements of an antitrust claim are (1) a 
violation of antitrust law; (2) injury and causation; and (3) damages . . . .”); 15 
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claims frequently break up the claim into three categories: “(1) 
a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) individual injury resulting 
from that violation; and (3) measurable damages.”55 Proving 
each element of an antitrust claim frequently requires large 
amounts of resources that are typically unavailable to the 
average consumer affected by anticompetitive behavior.56 For 
the goals of private antitrust enforcement to be realized, 
individuals must be capable of amassing enough resources to 
challenge the large corporations that typically engage in 
violations of the antitrust laws.57 
B. Antitrust Class Actions under Federal Law 
The representative class action constitutes one of the most 
contentious weapons in the antitrust plaintiff’s arsenal.58 The 
class mechanism takes steps to rectify the imbalance of 
resources that commonly plague antitrust claims made on an 
 
U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
therefor . . . .”). 
 55. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 56. See Lande & Davis, supra note 5, at 883 (noting the “difficulty of 
bringing suit” inherent in every private antitrust action). 
 57. See id. at 905 (“These private attorneys general . . . lawyers 
representing businesses, farmers, individuals, . . . often work thousands of 
hours and lay out millions of dollars in the course of prosecuting antitrust 
litigation . . . .”). 
 58. See David Inkeles, In re Deepwater Horizon and the Need to Clean Up 
Rule 23(b)(3) Certification Jurisprudence Through Legislation, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 
741, 750 (2015) (discussing the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) in the 
context of the presence of individual injuries and the need for legislative action 
in this sphere); Paul G. Karlsgodt & Dustin M. Dow, The Practical Approach: 
How the Roberts Court Has Enhanced Class Action Procedure by Strategically 
Carving at the Edges, 48 AKRON L. REV. 883, 890 (2015) (discussing the 
practical impacts of the Roberts Court’s class-action jurisprudence on 
application of the requirements of Rule 23); Robert H. Klonoff, The Future of 
Class Actions: The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 792 
(2013) (“When (b)(3) was first introduced in 1966, it was considered ‘the most 
controversial portion’ of modern Rule 23.”). 
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individual basis.59 Additionally, although there exists a notable 
body of state level antitrust class action jurisprudence and 
legislative activity,60 the federal courts retain exclusive 
jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims.61 Consequently, the 
bulk of antitrust class actions take place under federal class 
action law governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.62 
In order to certify any kind of class action under federal law, 
the putative class of plaintiffs must “affirmatively satisfy” the 
mandatory requirements enumerated in Rule 23(a) as well as 
the applicable requirements of Rule 23(b).63 Rule 23(a) outlines 
four prerequisites that must be satisfied by every federal class 
 
 59. See California v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701–02 (1979) (“[T]he Rule 
23 class-action device was designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.”); 
Klonoff, supra note 58, at 731 (recognizing the class action device as a 
“revolutionary vehicle for achieving mass justice”); see also Pet, supra note 10, 
at 173 (discussing the benefits and criticisms of class actions in the antitrust 
context and scrutinizing Rule 23’s heavy requirements). 
 60. See Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust 
Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673, 694–96 (2003) (analyzing and outlining the 
comparative advantages of the state and federal antitrust enforcement 
schemes); see generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2008). 
 61. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2018) (“The several district courts of the United 
States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations 
of this act . . . .”). 
 62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (“Class actions.”); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 855 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th 
ed. 2012) (noting that class actions under federal law represent the majority 
of antitrust class actions). 
 63. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (“[A] party 
seeking to maintain a class action must affirmatively demonstrate his 
compliance with Rule 23.” (citing Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 
350 (2011))). 
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action: numerosity,64 commonality,65 typicality,66 and adequacy 
of representation.67 
Rule 23(b)(3) demands the satisfaction of two additional 
requirements: “predominance”68 and “superiority.”69 Because 
the superiority requirement rarely serves as a bar to 
certification,70 the predominance requirement stands as the 
primary hurdle which a putative plaintiff class must surmount 
to gain certification.71 To satisfy the predominance requirement, 
a plaintiff class must prove that, in looking to the class as a 
whole, issues “common” to the class predominate over issues 
specific to individual class members.72 In the context of Rule 23, 
“a common question is one that is capable of class-wide 
 
 64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that “the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable” (emphasis added)). 
 65. See id. (a)(2) (requiring that “there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class” (emphasis added)). 
 66. See id. (a)(3) (requiring that “the claims or defenses of the 
representatives are typical of the claims or defenses of the class” (emphasis 
added)). 
 67. See id. (a)(4) (requiring that “the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class” (emphasis added)). 
 68. See id. (b)(3) (requiring that “the questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members” (emphasis added)). 
 69. See id. (requiring that “a class action [be] superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy” (emphasis 
added)). 
 70. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 62, at 859 (discussing 
the superiority requirement). 
 71. See Pet, supra note 10, at 157–58 (acknowledging the “elaborate 
showing from plaintiffs” demanded by courts before finding predominance 
satisfied); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 574 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming 
denial of class certification for failure to meet predominance); In re Asacol 
Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 62 (1st Cir. 2018) (reversing the lower court and 
decertifying the class for failure to meet predominance); In re New Motor 
Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(remanding the case to the lower court for reconsideration of the predominance 
requirement). 
 72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that the court find that “the 
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members”); see also Comcast, 569 U.S. at 
33 (reiterating the standard contained in the text of 23(b)(3)); Asacol, 907 F.3d 
at 51 (“[C]ommon issues must predominate over individual issues in order to 
certify a class.”). 
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resolution,”73 while an individual one is a question for which 
“members of the proposed class will need to present evidence 
that varies from member to member.”74 
While the goals of the class action mechanism rest in 
empowering the plaintiff class,75 the aim of the predominance 
inquiry is to determine whether the aggregation of the claims of 
individual class members can be dealt with in a manner that is 
efficient and fair.76 The predominance requirement assures that 
the class will be “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication 
by representation.”77 Further, predominance requires courts to 
refrain from “attempt[ing] to eliminate inefficiency by 
presuming to do away with the rights a party would customarily 
have to raise plausible individual challenges on [certain] 
issues.”78 
Prior to the Court’s class action jurisprudence of the past 
two decades,79 the Court readily admitted that predominance 
was typically easily satisfied in antitrust class actions.80 
However, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence reflects a 
 
 73. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight III), 
934 F.3d 619, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 
U.S. 338, 350 (2011)). 
 74. Id. (citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 
(2016)). 
 75. See Chelsey E. Turner, Class Actions: How Easy are They to Bring, 
and Why?, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 193, 196–97 (2017) (recounting 
the various policies underlying the class action mechanism). 
 76. See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 470 
(2013) (noting that the predominance requirement would reject “a case in 
which the asserted [common issue] . . . exhibits some fatal dissimilarity 
among class members that would make use of the class-action device 
inefficient or unfair”); Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51 (“Inefficiency can be pictured as 
a line of thousands of class members waiting their turn to offer testimony and 
evidence on individual issues.”). 
 77. Amgen, 568 U.S. at 470 (citing Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 623 (1997)). 
 78. Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51–52. 
 79. See infra Part III (discussing the effects on the predominance 
requirement of the past two decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 80. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) 
(“Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging . . . violations of 
the antitrust laws.”). 
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fundamental adjustment to the predominance standard in the 
context of federal class actions. 
III. The “Rigorous Analysis”: Wal-Mart and Comcast 
In the past decade, the Supreme Court heavily engaged in 
interpreting the contours of Rule 23.81 The Court handed down 
numerous major decisions spanning almost every aspect of class 
action law during this period.82 However, “much commentary 
regarding the Court’s tolerance for class actions has turned on 
its decisions affecting class certification standards.”83 Beginning 
in 2011 with the landmark case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes,84 and continuing in 2013 with Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend,85 the Court dramatically changed the landscape of 
federal class-action certification.86 Specifically, this shift 
drastically heightened the standard that a putative plaintiff 
class must meet when attempting to achieve certification.87 The 
Court adopted a “rigorous analysis” at the class certification 
 
 81. See Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 884 (noting that in 2009 “the 
Court began to grant certiorari over a group of cases that are widely perceived 
as changing the landscape of class litigation”); John Campbell, Unprotected 
Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, and Wholesale Change to Class Action 
Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463, 463 (2013) (“[The changes by the Supreme Court] 
so alter accepted paradigms that a class action attorney who retired in 2009 
would be almost useless today.”). 
 82. See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
662 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 
27 (2013); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013). 
 83. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 906. 
 84. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 85. 569 U.S. 27 (2013). 
 86. See Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 906 (noting the “seemingly 
severe limitations that [Wal-Mart] placed on plaintiffs’ abilities to certify 
classes, followed by Comcast’s even tighter squeeze”); Klonoff, supra note 58, 
at 778 (discussing the effects of Wal-Mart on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions). 
 87. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342 (“We consider whether the certification 
of the plaintiff class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) 
and (b)(2).”); Comcast, 569 U.S. at 29 (“We consider whether certification was 
appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).”). 
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stage.88 Importantly, this heightened analysis applied not only 
to the Court’s understanding of the commonality requirement of 
Rule 23(a),89 but also the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3).90 
A. Wal-Mart 
The underlying suit in Wal-Mart concerned 1.5 million 
former and current female employees of Wal-Mart who alleged 
that managers in local stores systematically discriminated 
against women.91 The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was that 
Wal-Mart’s lack of a consistent policy on pay and promotion 
combined with an inherent “corporate culture” bias against 
women produced gender-based discrimination at the stores.92 
The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion 
practices “violat[ed] . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.”93 Accordingly, the plaintiffs demanded “injunctive and 
declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay.”94 In support 
of their claim, the plaintiff class produced extensive data 
indicating that the “pay and promotion disparities at Wal-Mart 
could be explained only by gender discrimination” even when 
the expert “controlled for factors including . . . job performance, 
 
 88. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350–51 (“[C]ertification is proper only if 
the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of 
Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”(citations omitted)); Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33 
(same). 
 89. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350–52 (heightening the standard of the 
commonality requirement). 
 90. See Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34 (extending the “same analytical 
principles” from Wal-Mart to Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 91. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 343 (“The named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, 
representing the 1.5 million members of the certified class, are three current 
or former Wal-Mart employees who allege that the company discriminated 
against them on the basis of their sex . . . .”). 
 92. Id. at 344 (describing the plaintiffs’ claim that “local managers’ 
discretion over pay and promotions [was] exercised disproportionately in favor 
of men”). 
 93. Id. at 343. 
 94. Id. at 345. 
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length of time with the company, and the store where an 
employee worked.”95 
The plaintiffs sought class certification under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2),96 which the district court granted,97 
and a divided en banc court of appeals substantially affirmed.98 
The Supreme Court then granted Wal-Mart’s subsequent 
petition for certiorari on the issue of “whether the class 
certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with 
Rule 23(a).”99 The Supreme Court answered the question in the 
negative, reversed the court of appeals,100 and decertified the 
plaintiff class.101 In a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, the 
Court ruled that the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) was 
not satisfied because of the potentially differing questions 
underlying each putative class member’s claims.102 
In coming to its conclusion, the Court delineated a 
particularly stringent standard for commonality, stating that 
“[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’”103 Importantly, 
the Court held that the “common contention . . . must be of such 
a nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution—which 
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an 
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in 
 
 95. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 372 (2011) (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 96. See id. at 345–46 (majority opinion) (noting that the putative class 
relied on Rule 23(b)(2)). 
 97. Id. at 347. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 562 U.S. 1091 (2010) (granting 
certiorari). 
 100. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 347 (describing the position of the district 
court and the court of appeals “that respondents’ evidence of commonality was 
sufficient” to satisfy Rule 23(a)). 
 101. Id. at 367. 
 102. See id. at 352 (“Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all 
those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all 
the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the 
crucial question why was I disfavored.” (emphasis in original)). 
 103. Id. at 349–50 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 
(1982)). 
  
NO INJURY? NO CLASS  1393 
 
one stroke.”104 Further, and most impactful to the Court’s shift 
at the class certification stage overall, the majority noted that 
“certification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a 
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been 
satisfied . . . .”105 This “rigorous analysis” will often “entail some 
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.”106 
Although the “rigorous analysis” language was briefly 
mentioned by the Supreme Court previously,107 Wal-Mart 
represented a clear shift in the Court’s understanding of the 
commonality requirement away from the relatively light burden 
imposed by most lower courts at the class certification stage.108 
“[W]hat used to be a foregone conclusion now require[d] some 
analysis,”109 as the Court spoke broadly about the standard that 
Rule 23 generally imposed on a putative plaintiff class.110 “A 
party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate 
his compliance with the Rule,”111 signaling that litigants would 
not have to wait long before they witnessed a decision applying 
the “rigorous analysis” to the other parts of Rule 23. 
B. Comcast 
This application came just a year after Wal-Mart, when the 
Court heard arguments in another class certification case, 
 
 104. Id. at 350. 
 105. Id. 350–51 (emphasis added). 
 106. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011). 
 107. See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (“[A] Title 
VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial 
court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
have been satisfied.”). 
 108. Compare Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting 
that because the commonality requirement “may be satisfied by a single 
common issue, it is easily met”), Hochstadt v. Bos. Sci. Corp. 708 F. Supp. 2d 
95, 102 (D. Mass. 2010) (“The threshold of commonality is not a difficult one 
to meet.”), and Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(“The threshold of commonality is not high.” (internal quotations omitted)), 
with Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355 (requiring that plaintiffs present “significant 
proof” that the commonality requirement was satisfied). 
 109. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 910. 
 110. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350–51 (noting that “Rule 23 does not set 
forth a mere pleading standard” and is instead a “rigorous analysis”). 
 111. Id. at 350. 
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Comcast. In Comcast, roughly two million Comcast customers 
sought damages for Comcast’s alleged violation of antitrust 
laws.112 The plaintiffs asserted that Comcast’s anticompetitive 
behavior in the television market resulted in higher prices for 
consumers.113 Further, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3).114 
The class plaintiffs put forth several theories to establish 
that Comcast’s actions impacted and injured the putative 
class,115 including that “Comcast’s activities reduced the level of 
competition from ‘overbuilders,’ companies that build competing 
cable networks in areas where an incumbent cable company 
already operates.”116 The district court accepted the 
“overbuilder” theory of antitrust impact as “capable of 
class-wide proof,”117 and certified the class, finding that “the 
damages resulting from overbuilder-deterrence impact could be 
calculated on a class-wide basis.”118 On appeal, Comcast 
challenged class certification, arguing that the class failed to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) as the method of proof 
“did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of 
antitrust impact,”119 and essentially “failed to disaggregate 
damages from the one accepted theory of harm (the overbuilder 
 
 112. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 30 (2013) (“The named 
plaintiffs . . . are subscribers to Comcast’s cable-television services . . . [who] 
claim[] that [Comcast] entered into unlawful swap agreements, in violation of 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, and monopolized or attempted to monopolize services 
in the cluster, in violation of § 2.”). 
 113. See id. (“[Comcast’s] clustering scheme, [plaintiffs] contented, 
harmed subscribers in the Philadelphia cluster by eliminating competition 
and holding prices for cable services above competitive levels.”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 31 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ “proposed four theories of 
antitrust impact”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.; see Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2010) 
(“We conclude, with one caveat, that the Class has met its burden to 
demonstrate that the anticompetitive effect of clustering on overbuilder 
competition is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the 
class.”). 
 118. Comcast, 569 U.S. at 31. 
 119. Id. at 32. 
  
NO INJURY? NO CLASS  1395 
 
theory) from the other (rejected) theories of harm.”120 The Third 
Circuit rejected Comcast’s argument, finding that the attack on 
the plaintiffs’ methodology was improper at the class 
certification stage.121 
The Supreme Court, in another opinion by Justice Scalia 
(again writing for a five justice majority) reversed and 
decertified the class.122 Justice Scalia began by repeating the 
broad characterizations of the inquiry mandated by Rule 23 that 
he had espoused in Wal-Mart. 123F123 The Court emphasized that 
Rule 23 is a “rigorous analysis” that a court must seriously 
engage in at the class certification stage, 124F124 reiterating that 
“such an analysis will frequently ‘overlap with the merits of the 
plaintiff’s underlying claim.’”125F125 However, while in Wal-Mart 
Justice Scalia had his sights set on the requirements of Rule 
23(a), 126F126 this time he settled with Rule 23(b)(3) in his 
crosshairs. 127F127 Justice Scalia declared that “[t]he same analytical 
principles [that govern Rule 23(a)] govern Rule 23(b).” 128F128 Even 
 
 120. Pet, supra note 10, at 163. 
 121. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 206 (3d Cir. 2011) (“At 
the class certification stage we do not require that plaintiffs tie each theory of 
antitrust impact to an exact calculation of damages, but instead that they 
assure us that if they can prove antitrust impact, the resulting damages are 
capable of measurement . . . .”). 
 122. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 38 (2013) (reversing the lower 
courts and decertifying the class); see id. at 34 (“Respondents’ class action was 
improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
 123. Id. (“To come within the exception, a party seeking to maintain a class 
action ‘must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance’ with Rule 23.” (quoting 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 654 U.S. 338, 350 (2011))); see id. (“The Rule 
does not set forth a mere pleading standard.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 124. See id. (“[C]ertification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, 
after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been 
satisfied.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 125. Id. at 33–34; see id. at 34 (recognizing that “class determination 
generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal 
issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action”). 
 126. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) 
(discussing the requirements of Rule 23(a)). 
 127. See Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34–38 (applying the “rigorous analysis” of 
Wal-Mart to class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 128. Id. at 34. 
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further, “[r]ule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more 
demanding than Rule 23(a).”129 
Abiding by this “rigorous analysis,” the Court engaged in an 
assessment of the underlying validity of the plaintiffs’ method 
of damage calculations.130 As a standard, the Court stated that 
in the context of an antitrust class action the putative plaintiff 
class’ “calculation[s] need not be exact . . . but at the 
class-certification stage (as at trial), any model supporting a 
‘plaintiff’s damages case must be consistent with its liability 
case, particularly with respect to the alleged anticompetitive 
effect of the violation.’”131 Because “the model [did] not even 
attempt to do that, [the plaintiffs] cannot possibly establish that 
damages are susceptible of measurement across the entire class 
for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).”132 The Court rejected the 
interpretations of the lower courts, concluding that they would 
essentially “reduce 23(b)(3) to a nullity.”133 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and Comcast 
collectively establish and reaffirm the current standard that 
Rule 23(b)(3) demands at class certification, the “rigorous 
analysis.”134 Pertinently, the Court seems to suggest that 
damages calculations must now be done prior to class 
certification and that district courts must delve into the merits 
of an expert’s relevant calculating mechanism at the class 
certification stage, long before trial.135 On its face, this may 
seem like a straightforward proclamation, but the question 
 
 129. Id. (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 
(1997)). 
 130. See id. at 35–37 (analyzing the plaintiffs’ method of proving damages 
and determining whether it satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 131. Id. at 35 (quoting ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING 
ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 57, 62 (2d ed. 2010)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 36; see id. (“Under that logic, at the class-certification stage any 
method of measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, 
no matter how arbitrary the measurements may be.” (emphasis in original)). 
 134. See Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 58, at 914 (noting the Court’s 
“helpful tone emphasizing the need for a rigorous analysis to ensure that the 
plaintiff can prove common issues through common evidence”). 
 135. See id. at 915 (“The Comcast decision . . . seem[s] to suggest . . . that 
district courts are required to consider the merits of an expert at the class 
certification phase.”). 
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remains: if a court is to engage in such a “rigorous analysis,” 
how will a court know when a putative class has satisfied it in 
the context of antitrust injury? 
IV. Antitrust Injury and Predominance 
Aside from proving an actual violation of the antitrust 
laws,136 establishing the injury element of an antitrust claim 
tends to be the critical issue of any successful antitrust class 
action.137 Any plaintiff class must put forth a method of 
establishing injury that satisfies the predominance requirement 
of Rule 23(b)(3).138 Establishing antitrust injury frequently 
involves voluminous testimony from an assertedly qualified 
expert.139 And while the qualification of experts and their 
testimony frequently proves to be determinative in its own right 
on the issue of proving injury, the inquiry is one that is separate 
 
 136. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018) (outlining the standards to constitute a 
violation of the federal antitrust laws). 
 137. See, e.g., id. § 15(a) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business 
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
therefor in any district court of the United States . . . .”); see also Joshua P. 
Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of 
Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 970 (2010) (“[T]he decision whether to 
certify a class in an antitrust case tends to turn on whether plaintiffs have 
proposed a method of proving class-wide injury, or “common impact,” at the 
class certification stage.”); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust 
Litig. (Rail Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“To establish 
liability under [the Clayton Act], each plaintiff must prove not only an 
antitrust violation, but also an injury to its business or property and a causal 
relation between the two.”). 
 138. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 622–23 (“The party seeking class 
certification must affirmatively demonstrate that the commonality and 
predominance requirements are satisfied.” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011))). 
 139. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 40–87 (D.D.C. 2017) (engaging in the complex inquiry 
of assessing the “relevance of all expert opinions and the reliability of the 
experts’ methodology under Daubert”); see also In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 
907 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2018) (relying on expert evidence provided from both 
parties regarding “the propriety of class certification”). 
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from and must be undertaken prior to the class certification 
analysis.140 
Following Supreme Court precedent that at the time 
limited the extent to which a court should inquire into merits 
issues at the class certification stage,141 courts historically 
viewed the assessment of the plaintiff expert’s method of proof 
of injury at the class certification stage to be an inappropriately 
premature assessment of the merits.142 However, the “rigorous 
analysis” demanded by Rule 23 post-Wal-Mart and Comcast 
seemingly rejected this approach.143 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, courts 
diverged in their application of the predominance standard to 
plaintiffs’ proof of injury. Some courts held that injury need not 
be established as to every member of the class, so long as 
 
 140. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (“When an expert’s report or testimony is critical to class 
certification, . . . a district court must make a conclusive ruling on any 
challenge to that expert’s qualifications . . . before it may rule on a motion for 
class certification.”). 
 141. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (“We find 
nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any 
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to 
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 206 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(limiting its inquiry at the class certification stage stating that “[the court] 
addresses only whether Plaintiffs have provided a method to measure and 
quantify damages on a class-wide basis” rather than “determining on the 
merits whether the method[] is a just and reasonable inference or 
speculative”); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The Court 
made clear in [Eisen] that [the class certification] determination does not 
permit or require a preliminary inquiry into the merits.”); In re Lease Oil 
Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 403, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“In evaluating a motion 
for class certification, . . . the court does not have the authority to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case, and hence the substantive 
allegations contained in the complaint are accepted as true.” (citing Eisen, 417 
U.S. at 177)). 
 143. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011) 
(recognizing that the “rigorous analysis will entail some overlap with the 
merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim”); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 
U.S. 27, 33–34 (2013) (reiterating that the rigorous analysis “will frequently 
entail overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim”). 
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“widespread injury to the class” was proven.144 Others adopted 
a more exacting test that required plaintiffs to put forth 
“common proof” that established injury as to every member of 
the class.145 
Unsurprisingly, courts continue to struggle to come to a 
consensus on the applicable standard for this determination in 
the wake of Wal-Mart and Comcast.146 While a few courts retain 
the less stringent standard, others have seen Wal-Mart and 
Comcast as reason to adopt the more stringent requirement that 
injury be shown through “common proof” as to the entire 
 
 144. See Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings, 246 F.R.D. 293, 310 
(D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class 
certification where the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In 
re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, 223 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(“The ‘impact’ element of an antitrust claim need not be established as to each 
and every class member; rather, it is enough if the plaintiffs’ proposed method 
of proof promises to establish ‘widespread injury to the class’ as a result of the 
defendant’s antitrust violation.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 
F.R.D. 297, 321 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“Courts have routinely observed that the 
inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class certification where 
the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In re NASDAQ 
Mkt-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Even if it 
could be shown that some individual class members were not injured, class 
certification, nevertheless, is appropriate where the antitrust violation has 
cause widespread injury to the class.”). 
 145. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that 
the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence 
that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.”); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We have repeatedly 
held that where fact of damage cannot be established for every class member 
through proof common to the class, the need to establish antitrust liability for 
individual class member defeats Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.”); In re New 
Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(finding common proof necessary to show that “each member of the class was 
in fact injured” to support a finding of predominance). 
 146. See generally Chelsey E. Turner, Class Actions: How Easy are They to 
Bring, and Why?, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 193 (2017) (surveying the 
kinds of analyses that courts go through when determining whether a class 
should be certified); Elena Kamenir, Seeking Antitrust Class Certification: The 
Role of Individual Damage Calculations in Meeting Class Action 
Predominance Requirements, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 199 (2015) (discussing 
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) and whether different methods of damages 
calculations defeat the predominance requirement at the class certification 
stage). 
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class.147 These dueling theories of the issue represent a schism 
in the judiciary’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s recent 
class action jurisprudence.148 The central question of debate: 
how stringent did the Supreme Court make the predominance 
standard in the context of antitrust class actions?149 It seems 
that the more lenient standards for proving injury permissible 
in the pre-Wal-Mart era may not have survived under the new, 
more restricted conception of Rule 23. 
The clearest identifiable stress point between the two 
contrasting certification standards remains the certification of 
classes that contain some (known or unknown) amount of 
uninjured putative class members.150 If there is a new, more 
stringent, “common proof” requirement, does it allow for the 
existence of uninjured class members in a certified class?151 This 
is a problem that will continue to plague the federal courts as 
“it is almost inevitable that [any] class will include some people 
 
 147. See e.g., Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (“[P]laintiffs . . . must show 
that they can prove, through common evidence, that all class members were 
in fact injured by the alleged conspiracy.”). 
 148. Compare In re Cathode Ray Tube Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-5944-SC, 
2013 WL 5391159, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013) (distinguishing Comcast as 
a case where “the plaintiffs’ theory of damages did not map to their theory of 
liability so the plaintiffs [in Comcast] failed to show through common evidence 
that all class members had been harmed by the alleged conspiracy”), with In 
re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 555, 566 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(“[Q]uestions of impact in this case may call for individualized inquiries that 
predominate over common ones, [therefore] the Court finds that Plaintiffs 
must demonstrate a method for proving impact on a class-wide basis.”). 
 149. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
III), 934 F.3d 619, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (analyzing the extent to which the 
“hard look required by Rule 23” should delve into the reliability of common 
evidence). 
 150. See id. at 624 (looking to conflicting “cases addressing the question of 
when, if ever, a class may include concededly uninjured members” in 
determining assess how many individual adjudications are too many for a 
court to allow certification under Rule 23). 
 151. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(questioning whether it would “put the cart before the horse to read Rule 23 
to require that a plaintiff demonstrate prior to class certification that each 
class member is injured”); Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (recounting the 
plaintiffs’ arguments that “predominance does not require common evidence 
extending to all class members” (emphasis in original)). 
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who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct.”152 Even 
further, it is common for the plaintiffs’ method for proving 
impact itself to reveal that some of the putative class members 
remain uninjured by the defendant’s antitrust violation.153 In 
the face of this recurring scenario, it is essential that courts act 
uniformly in adopting a reliable standard that conforms with 
the principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Wal-Mart and Comcast. 
However, the issue of uninjured class members cannot be 
solved through merely adopting the more stringent “common 
proof” standard.154 Even after adopting this standard, courts 
recognize that it would seem impractical to require injury to 
every single putative class member such that the existence of a 
single uninjured class member would defeat predominance.155 Is 
it truly necessary that the method of proof show injury to “every 
single member” of the putative class?156 If not, then is there 
some amount of uninjured members that would be acceptable 
when certifying an antitrust class action?157 This question leads 
courts consider a de minimis exception which would allow 
certification in the event of a de minimis amount of uninjured 
 
 152. Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 153. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (noting that “the damages 
model . . . indicate[d] that 2,037 members of the proposed class” suffered no 
injury). 
 154. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2015) (“In 
certifying a (b)(3) class there is an almost inevitable tension between excluding 
all non-injured parties from the defined class and including all injured parties 
in the defined class.”). 
 155. See, e.g., id. at 23 (noting the “obvious utility of allowing the inclusion 
of some uninjured class members in the certified class”); Asacol, 907 F.3d at 
58 (“We also agree that it would put the cart before the horse, to read Rule 23 
to require that a plaintiff demonstrate prior to class certification that each 
class member is injured.”). 
 156. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (analyzing the plaintiff’s 
argument that “predominance does not require common evidence extending to 
all class members”); Nexium, 777 F.3d at 21 (“[I]t is difficult to understand 
why the presence of uninjured class members at the preliminary stage should 
defeat class certification.”). 
 157. See Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51 (“[T]he question thus becomes: Can a class 
be certified in this case even though injury-in-fact will be an individual issue, 
the resolution of which will vary among class members?”). 
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class members.158 However, even if one accepts the existence of 
the de minimis exception, the question becomes how many 
uninjured putative class members would be considered de 
minimis and how many uninjured members would prove too 
numerous to allow for the proper administration of justice.159 
V. Proving Antitrust Injury post-Wal-Mart 
This Part proceeds in three sections. First, it analyzes 
which of the two standards that courts have applied for proof of 
injury in antitrust class actions should be applied 
post-Wal-Mart and Comcast. It argues that the more stringent 
“common proof” standard will be adopted over the less stringent 
“widespread impact” standard. Second, this Part analyzes the 
de minimis exception as it applies to the “common proof” 
standard and reviews judicial analysis of the exception. Third, 
in the final section, this Part catalogues the considerations that 
courts should find applicable in determining whether the de 
minimis exception is satisfied. 
A. Dueling Requirements: “Common Proof” vs “Widespread 
Injury” 
In the post-Walmart era, courts recognize the Supreme 
Court’s holding that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement 
demands a “rigorous analysis” at the class certification stage.160 
This means that district courts are empowered to engage in 
significant review of the underlying merits of a class action, 
 
 158. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (declining to expressly adopt the 
de minimis exception); Nexium, 777 F.3d at 25 (“We think that a certified class 
may include a de minimis number of potentially uninjured parties.”). 
 159. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 135 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The next question is whether the 
number of uninjured shippers in the putative class can be considered de 
minimis.”); In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521, 2017 WL 
679367, at *64 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (deciding whether the number of uninjured 
members could be considered de minimis). 
 160. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
III), 934 F.3d 619, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[C]onfronting such questions [of 
determining liability] is part-and-parcel of the ‘hard look’ required by 
Wal-Mart and Comcast . . . .”). 
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even at the relatively early class certification stage.161 This 
review applies not only to the requirements contained in Rule 
23(a), as addressed in Wal-Mart,162 but also the predominance 
requirement of 23(b)(3).163 “If anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 
23(a).”164 It then follows, that Wal-Mart and Comcast seem to 
require a “rigorous analysis” that will often “overlap with the 
merits” of the method by which any putative class of plaintiffs 
seeks to establish the element of antitrust impact or injury.165 
Multiple courts of appeals, both before and after Wal-Mart, 
embraced this inquisitive posture in the context of antitrust 
class actions and required that injury be established as to the 
entire class through “common proof” in order to satisfy the 
predominance requirement.166 On the other hand, some courts 
 
 161. See id. (“[The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence] does not . . . permit 
district courts considering class certification to defer questions about the 
number and nature of any individualized inquiries that might be necessary to 
establish liability.”). 
 162. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“[The 
plaintiff] must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently 
numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 163. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35 (2013) (“The same 
analytical principles [as Rule 23(a)] govern Rule 23(b).”). 
 164. Id.; Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997) 
(“Even if Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement may be satisfied . . . the 
predominance criterion is far more demanding.”). 
 165. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 626 (“The party seeking class 
certification must affirmatively demonstrate that the . . . predominance 
requirement[] is satisfied through . . . a rigorous analysis that will often 
overlap with the merits.”); see also Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (recognizing that 
certification is only proper after a “rigorous analysis” that the prerequisites of 
rule 23(a) are required). 
 166. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that 
the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence 
that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.”); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We have repeatedly 
held that where fact of damage cannot be established for every class member 
through proof common to the class, the need to establish antitrust liability for 
individual class member defeats Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.”); In re New 
Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(finding common proof necessary to show that “each member of the class was 
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continue to certify classes without engaging in the heavy review 
authorized by the post-Walmart jurisprudence.167 These courts 
merely required proof of “widespread injury to the class” to meet 
predominance.168 The differences in these two standards 
amounts to essentially two different predominance 
requirements. 
On one hand, the analysis involved in the “common proof” 
test imposes a restrictive requirement onto a putative plaintiff 
class.169 The task for the plaintiffs at class certification is to 
demonstrate that “the element of antitrust impact is capable of 
proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class 
rather than individual to its members.”170 For a class to be 
certified, district courts must conduct a “rigorous assessment of 
 
in fact injured” to support a finding of predominance); Rail Freight III, 934 
F.3d at 624 (“[P]laintiffs . . . must show that they can prove, through common 
evidence, that all class members were in fact injured by the alleged 
conspiracy.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 
811 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In conducting [the class certification] analysis, the court 
should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for 
the trial on the merits.”). 
 168. See Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings, 246 F.R.D. 293, 310 
(D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class 
certification where the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In 
re Nw. Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, 223 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(“The ‘impact’ element of an antitrust claim need not be established as to each 
and every class member; rather, it is enough if the plaintiffs’ proposed method 
of proof promises to establish ‘widespread injury to the class’ as a result of the 
defendant’s antitrust violation.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 
F.R.D. 297, 321 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“Courts have routinely observed that the 
inability to show injury as to a few does not defeat class certification where 
the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the class.”); In re NASDAQ 
Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Even if it 
could be shown that some individual class members were not injured, class 
certification, nevertheless, is appropriate where the antitrust violation has 
cause widespread injury to the class.”). 
 169. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (discussing the demands placed 
upon the plaintiffs by Rule 23(b)(3)); see also Pet, supra note 10, at 160 
(analyzing the “high burden” demanded by the In re Hydrogen Peroxide court’s 
application of the “common proof” requirement). 
 170. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311–12; see also Blades v. Monsanto 
Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005) (“For a class to be certified, plaintiffs 
need to demonstrate that common issues prevail as to the existence of . . . the 
fact of injury.”). 
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the available evidence and the method or methods by which 
plaintiffs propose to use the evidence to prove impact at trial.”171 
By this standard, the presence of individualized inquiries into 
antitrust injury or impact will defeat predominance and 
preclude certification.172 Consequently, a putative plaintiff class 
seemingly will be unable to achieve class certification if its 
method for proving injury is unable to establish injury for every 
member of the class.173 
On the other hand, the requirement of “widespread injury” 
to the class imposes a lighter burden upon a putative class of 
plaintiffs.174 The presence of some individualized inquiries into 
impact and injury does not preclude certification.175 The 
 
 171. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312. 
 172. See New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 20 (“In antitrust class actions, 
common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust violation and the 
fact of antitrust impact cannot be established through common proof.”); 
Blades, 400 F.3d at 566 (“If, to make a prima facie showing on a given 
questions, the members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that 
varies from member to member, then it is an individual question.”); Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (noting that “impact often is critically important for 
the purpose of evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement because 
it is an element of the claim that may call for individual, as opposed to 
common, proof”); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail 
Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Given the need for at least 
2,037 individual determinations of injury and causation, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying class certification on the ground that 
common issues do not predominate.”). 
 173. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (“Without common proof of injury 
and causation, section 4 plaintiffs cannot establish predominance.”); see also 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We have 
repeatedly held that where fact of damage cannot be established for every 
class member through proof common to the class, the need to establish 
antitrust liability for individual class member defeats Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance.”). 
 174. See Meijer, 246 F.R.D. at 310 (“[T]he inability to show injury as to a 
few does not defeat class certification where the plaintiffs can show 
widespread injury to the class.”). 
 175. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 815 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“It is well established that the presence of individualized 
questions regarding damages does not prevent certification under Rule 
23(b)(3).”); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing 
that “the need for individual damages determinations does not, in and of itself, 
require denial of [a] motion for certification” under Rule 23(b)(3)); Cardizem, 
200 F.R.D. at 319 (“The fact that there may be some individualized questions 
pertaining to impact will not defeat class certification.”). 
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plaintiff class need not show that impact or injury occurred in 
fact, merely that it was susceptible to proof on a “class-wide” 
basis.176 Further, certification could be achieved through 
inference of “facts . . . which will tend to establish, perhaps 
circumstantially, that each class member was injured.”177 
Rather than a heavy inquiry, the court engages in a more 
generalized analysis.178 Following this standard, courts have 
been willing to certify classes even in cases where a number of 
putative class members remain uninjured.179 
Despite being presented with this particular issue,180 the 
Supreme Court has yet to specifically clarify which test should 
prevail.181 However, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in the Rail Freight Antitrust Litigation 
cases,182 was recently presented with an opportunity to address 
the issue and apply the principles of Wal-Mart and Comcast to 
this context.183 There, the plaintiffs’ damages model indicated 
 
 176. See Nw. Airlines, 208 F.R.D. at 223 (“Plaintiffs need not show 
antitrust impact in fact occurred on a class-wide basis.” (emphasis in 
original)); NASDAQ, 169 F.R.D. at 523 (“Even if it could be shown that some 
individual class members were not injured, class certification, nevertheless, is 
appropriate where the antitrust violation has caused widespread injury to the 
class.”). 
 177. NASDAQ, 169 F.R.D. at 523. 
 178. See id. (“The impact element necessitates only an illustration of 
generalized inquiry.”); Nw. Airlines, 208 F.R.D. at 223 (requiring only that 
injury be only “as a general matter amenable to common proof”). 
 179. See e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 
825 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a proposed class consists largely (or entirely, for that 
matter) of members who are ultimately shown to have suffered no harm, that 
may not mean that the class was improperly certified but only that the class 
failed to meet its burden of proof on the merits.”). 
 180. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146) (2016) (asking whether a class may 
be certified or maintained when a class consists of some number of uninjured 
class members). 
 181. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1050 (2016) 
(finding that the issue was not “fairly presented by th[e] case”). 
 182. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight I), 725 
F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust 
Litig.  (Rail Freight III), 934 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 183. See Rail Freight I, 725 F.3d at 253–54 (looking to Comcast to inform 
the analysis in the matter before the court); Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 
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that 2,037 members of the putative class did not suffer an 
injury.184 The Rail Freight court analyzed how the Supreme 
Court’s recent class action jurisprudence changed the level of 
scrutiny for a class of plaintiffs in the federal courts.185 
In its initial decision, just following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Comcast, the D.C. Circuit established that, “[t]he 
plaintiffs must show that they can prove, through common 
evidence, that all class members were in fact injured by the 
alleged antitrust conspiracy.”186 The court emphasized the more 
stringent standard, requiring that the common evidence 
establish injury as to the entire class.187 Importantly, the Rail 
Freight I court took note of the profound restrictive effects of 
Comcast on the issues of predominance and antitrust injury.188 
It recounted pre-Comcast decisions in other circuits that 
permitted certification even when common proof injury was not 
available for every putative class member.189 With these in 
mind, the court concluded that after Comcast it was “now clear, 
however, that Rule 23 not only authorizes a hard look at the 
soundness of statistical models that purport to show 
predominance—it demands it.”190 The D.C. Circuit remanded 
 
(looking to Wal-Mart and Comcast as two of the “three recent cases [that] 
address the contours of th[e] analysis”). 
 184. Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624. 
 185. See id. at 623 (“The parties dispute the extent to which a court, in 
conducting the ‘hard look’ required by Rule 23, should assess the reliability of 
common evidence.”). 
 186. Rail Freight I, 725 F.3d at 252 (citing Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997)). 
 187. See id. (“[W]e do expect the common evidence to show all class 
members suffered some injury.” (emphasis in original)). 
 188. See id. at 255 (“Before [Comcast], the case law was far more 
accommodating to class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
 189. See id. (noting the “cases from other circuits suggesting that . . . ‘class 
certification is not precluded simply because a class may include persons who 
have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct’” (quoting Mims v. Stewart 
Title Guar. Co., 590 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2009); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. 
Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009))). 
 190. Id. 
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the case so that the lower court could engage in the “common 
proof” analysis required by Rule 23(b)(3).191 
After the lower court denied class certification on 
remand,192 the D.C. Circuit heard the matter again.193 The Rail 
Freight III court affirmed the denial of class certification, 
reiterating the “common proof” standard,194 and rejecting the 
“widespread impact” standard.195 Without “common proof” of 
injury and causation, “[S]ection 4 plaintiffs cannot establish 
predominance.”196 In coming to this conclusion, the Rail Freight 
III court again recounted the three Supreme Court decisions 
most pertinent to its analysis, including Wal-Mart and 
Comcast.197 The court justified its application of the “common 
proof” standard as a “rigorous analysis” of the plaintiff’s method 
of proof: 
[The Supreme Court] does not, as the plaintiffs here contend, 
permit district courts considering class certification to defer 
questions about the number and nature of any individualized 
inquiries that might be necessary to establish liability. To the 
contrary, confronting such questions is part-and-parcel of the hard 
look required by Wal-Mart and Comcast, as recognized even by 
those courts permitting a class to include some small number of 
concededly uninjured individuals.198 
As reflected in the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in the Rail Freight 
Litigation, the less stringent “widespread injury” standard does 
not fulfill the required “rigorous analysis” of Wal-Mart and 
 
 191. See id. (“[W]e vacate the district court’s class certification decision 
and remand the case to permit the district court to reconsider its decision in 
light of Comcast Corp v. Behrend.”). 
 192. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight II), 
292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 145 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 193. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight III), 
934 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 194. See id. at 624 (“[P]laintiffs, to establish predominance, must show 
that they can prove, through common evidence, that all class members were 
in fact injured by the alleged conspiracy.”). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 623. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 626. 
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Comcast.199 In contrast, the “common proof” standard allows the 
district court to properly engage in the analysis now required by 
Rule 23.200 Additionally, the goal of the predominance 
requirement is to avoid inefficient or unfair aggregation of 
claims.201 The more stringent “common proof” standard better 
serves this goal by taking into account whether individual 
inquiries into injury and impact would defeat predominance.202 
Even more recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reaffirmed its use of the “common proof” standard in the 
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation.203  
There, the Third Circuit emphasized the rigorous analysis 
necessary and rejected an impermissible “reli[ance] on 
averages” to show “common proof of injury” at the class 
certification stage.204 The Lamictal court followed the much 
cited pre-Wal-Mart case, In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
 
 199. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2013) (stating that 
under the widespread injury standard “any method of measurement is 
acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, . . . reduc[ing] Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
requirement to a nullity”). 
 200. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
I), 725 F.3d 244, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is now indisputably the role of the 
district court to scrutinize the evidence before granting certification, . . . [i]f 
the damages model cannot withstand this scrutiny then, that is not just a 
merits issue.”). 
 201. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2018) (“The 
aim of the predominance inquiry is to test whether any dissimilarity among 
the claims of class members can be dealt with in a manner that is not 
inefficient or unfair.”); see also id. (“Inefficiency can be pictured as a line of 
thousands of class members waiting their turn to offer testimony and evidence 
on individual issues.”). 
 202. See Rail Freight I, 725 F.3d at 255 (observing that after Comcast the 
district court should “consider the damages model’s flaw in its certification 
decision”). 
 203. See In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 957 F.3d 184, 
191 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[I]t suffices if [the direct purchasers] show that injury is 
capable of common proof at trial.” (emphasis added)). 
 204. See id. at 192–94 (vacating class certification and remanding “for the 
District Court to analyze the evidence and arguments” under the proper 
standard). 
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Litigation,205 in coming to its conclusion.206 Hydrogen Peroxide 
had been one of the first courts to announce the “common proof” 
standard in the context of antitrust class actions and was 
continuously followed by the Third Circuit over the years.207 The 
Lamictal decision reaffirms the Third Circuit’s commitment to 
the “common proof” standard and signals to other courts that 
the standard is the only way to properly conduct the rigorous 
analysis required at the class certification stage. 
Moving forward with these principles in mind, it is likely 
that courts will follow the D.C. Circuit in Rail Freight, the Third 
Circuit in Lamictal, as well as other pre-Comcast courts,208 in 
adopting the “common proof” standard. 
B. Recognizing a De Minimis Exception 
Once courts adopt the more stringent predominance 
analysis requiring “common proof” of injury in antitrust class 
actions, they still must face the frequently occurring problem of 
some amount of uninjured class members. In almost any class 
action, especially in the context of antitrust actions, it is 
possible—if not outright probable—that some number of class 
members will remain uninjured by the defendant’s antitrust 
 
 205. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 206. See Lamictal, 957 F.3d at 191 (following the “longstanding rule 
announced in Hydrogen Peroxide, . . . that a putative class must demonstrate 
that its claims are capable of common proof at trial by a preponderance of the 
evidence”). 
 207. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311–12 (“[T]he task for plaintiffs 
at class certification is to demonstrate that the element of antitrust impact is 
capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather 
than individual to its members.”); see also Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 
687 F.3d 583, 601 (3d Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that the 
element of [the legal claim] is capable of proof at trial through evidence that 
is common to the class rather than individual to its members.’” (quoting 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311) (alteration in original))); In re Modafinil 
Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The class should only 
be certified ‘if such impact is . . . susceptible to proof at trial through available 
evidence common to the class.’” (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide, 522 F.3d at 325)). 
 208. See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 
F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (adopting the “common proof” standard); Blades v. 
Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 572 (8th Cir. 2005) (same). 
  
NO INJURY? NO CLASS  1411 
 
violation.209 This problem becomes exacerbated when it is clear 
at the class certification stage that some number of putative 
class members are, in fact, uninjured.210 As a result, even in 
adopting the rigorous “common proof” test that will likely 
become the norm, courts must still determine how to resolve this 
seemingly frequent issue.211 Some courts respond by adopting a 
de minimis exception, in which class certification would still be 
appropriate so long as the number of uninjured members is de 
minimis212 or not a great many.213 There is a small but 
informative sample of federal courts that have addressed the 
presence of the de minimis exception in the post-Comcast era.214 
 
 209. See Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (“While 
it is almost inevitable that a class will include some people who have not been 
injured by the defendant’s conduct because at the outset of the case many 
members may be unknown . . . this possibility does not preclude class 
certification.”). 
 210. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 813 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(“[C]lass certification is not precluded simply because a class may include 
persons who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct . . . the 
possibility that some may fail to prevail on their individual claims will not 
defeat class membership.”). 
 211. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Can 
a class be certified in this case even though injury-in-fact will be an individual 
issue, the resolution of which will vary among class members?”); In re Rail 
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 623 
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he damages model . . . indicates that 2,037 members of 
the proposed class—or 12.7 percent—suffered only negative overcharges and 
thus no injury from any conspiracy.”). 
 212. See De Minimis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining de 
minimis as a fact or thing “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in 
deciding an issue or case”). 
 213. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(holding that “a certified class may include a de minimis number of potentially 
uninjured parties”); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 
802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] class should not be certified if it is apparent that 
it contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of 
the defendant.”); Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 
2016) (“[A] fortuitous non-injury to a subset of class members does not 
necessarily defeat certification of the entire class.”). 
 214. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“A number of other circuit and 
district courts have addressed the question of uninjured class members at 
class certification post-Comcast . . . .”). 
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit first addressed 
the possibility of the de minimis exception in the Nexium 
Antitrust Litigation.215 There, the district court certified a class 
of plaintiffs alleging that a pharmaceutical company engaged in 
certain anticompetitive behavior and thus the price of the drug 
Nexium was artificially inflated.216 The defendants challenged 
certification on appeal, arguing that the “common proof” 
standard precluded certification when some of the class 
members did not suffer an injury due to the anticompetitive 
behavior, as was the case there.217 The Nexium court rejected 
the defendant’s argument and affirmed the lower court’s grant 
of class certification, expressly adopting the de minimis 
exception.218 
The Nexium court noted the recurring nature of the 
“tension” that courts face in certifying class actions.219 
“Excluding all uninjured class members at the certification 
stage is almost impossible in many cases, given the 
inappropriateness of certifying . . . a class defined in terms of 
legal injury.”220 Accordingly, the court concluded that it would 
be unreasonable to require plaintiffs to make a showing that “is 
simply not possible . . . at the class certification stage.”221 
Further, the First Circuit found that rejecting a de minimis 
exception would “run counter to fundamental class action 
policies.”222 The purpose of class action law is to achieve 
efficiencies not found in repeated individual litigations about 
 
 215. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(questioning whether “the presence of uninjured class members at the 
preliminary stage should defeat class certification”). 
 216. Id. at 13–14. 
 217. Id. at 14. 
 218. Id. at 25. 
 219. See id. at 22 (“In certifying a (b)(3) class there is an almost inevitable 
tension between excluding all non-injured parties from the defined class and 
including all injured parties in the defined class.”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
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the same matter.223 Moreover, the primary class contemplated 
by Rule 23(b)(3) is the class in which a large number of 
individuals have suffered a relatively small amount of 
damages.224 Absent a de minimis exception, it would be nearly 
impossible to certify a class consisting of “the very group that 
Rule 23(b)(3) was intended to protect.”225 
Subsequently, in the In re Asacol Antitrust Litigation,226 the 
First Circuit again encountered the presence of uninjured 
putative class members, but this time in much larger 
numbers.227 There, the district court certified the class and 
determined that the Nexium decision allowed for a finding that 
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) had been satisfied despite the 
large amount of uninjured class members.228 This time around 
the First Circuit reversed and decertified the class,229 
disapproving of the lower court’s reading of Nexium.230 The 
Asacol court distinguished Nexium stating that Asacol was “a 
case in which any class member may be uninjured, and there 
[were] apparently thousands who in fact suffered no injury. The 
need to identify those individuals will predominate and render 
an adjudication unmanageable . . . .”231 Importantly, however, 
and despite further limiting the scope of Nexium on grounds 
 
 223. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (“[T]he 
Advisory Committee sought to cover cases in which a class action would 
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense . . . .”). 
 224. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 23 (noting the purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) as the 
“vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually would be 
without effective strength to bring their opponents to court at all”). 
 225. Id. 
 226. 907 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 227. Id. at 45–47; see id. at 51 (“Plaintiffs’ class nevertheless includes 
consumers who would have continued to purchase a brand drug for various 
reasons, even if a cheaper, generic version had been available.”). 
 228. See id. at 52 (“The district court in this case sought to track Nexium, 
finding that prior to judgment, it will be possible to establish a mechanism for 
distinguishing the injured from the uninjured class members.”). 
 229. Id. at 58. 
 230. See id. at 53 (disagreeing with the district court that “Nexium 
blesse[d]” the class certification at issue). 
 231. Id. at 53–54. 
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discussed below,232 the First Circuit signaled that it would still 
remain open to certifying classes in which a de minimis 
exception would apply.233 Unfortunately for the putative class, 
this was not an instance in which the exception could be 
satisfied and consequently, in the court’s opinion, the class was 
uncertifiable.234 
The D.C. Circuit similarly discussed the de minimis 
exception in the Rail Freight Antitrust Litigation.235 On remand 
from Rail Freight I, the district court interpreted the earlier 
appellate decision requiring “common proof” to allow for a de 
minimis exception.236 The district court stated that a de minimis 
number of class members requiring individualized proof of 
injury and causation would not preclude a finding of 
predominance,237 although it found that the particular 
circumstances there did not satisfy the requirements of the 
exception.238 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling, while avoiding an express adoption of the de 
 
 232. See infra Part V.C (analyzing the Asacol court’s rejection of Nexium 
based on the “winnowing mechanism” used in Nexium). 
 233. See Asacol, 907 F.3d at 53 (“Relatedly, this is not a case in which a 
very small absolute number of class members might be picked off in a 
manageable, individualized process at or before trial.”). 
 234. See id. at 53–54 (finding that the need to identify uninjured class 
members will “predominate” and render adjudication “unmanageable”). 
 235. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
III), 934 F.3d 619, 623–26 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (analyzing the problem presented 
by the “2,037 class members for whom [the plaintiffs’] damages model shows 
no injury”). 
 236. See id. at 624 (“[T]he district court held that our opinion did not 
require common evidence of injury to all class members.”); see also In re Rail 
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight II), 292 F. Supp. 3d. 14, 
135 (D.D.C. 2017) (“If the putative class includes only a de minimis number of 
uninjured members, then plaintiffs have satisfied the . . . standard for 
predominance and have demonstrated that they can prove class-wide injury 
through common evidence at trial.”). 
 237. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (recounting that the district court 
“agreed with the plaintiffs that common proof covering virtually all members 
of the proposed class” would be permissible for certification). 
 238. Id. 
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minimis exception.239 The D.C. Circuit found that even 
“assum[ing] that the district court correctly recognized a de 
minimis exception,”240 the number of uninjured class members 
was too numerous to meet the exception.241 However, the Rail 
Freight III court suggested that a case in which fewer class 
members remained uninjured might well prompt the court to 
expressly adopt the exception.242 
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the situation of uninjured class members in Torres v. 
Mercer Canyons Inc.243 There, although the court did not 
expressly mention the de minimis exception, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a standard that largely mirrors the de minimis 
exception.244 In Torres, the defendant claimed that the presence 
of “certain ‘non-injured’ individuals” defeated predominance.245 
The Torres court concluded that “such fortuitous non-injury to a 
subset of class members does not necessarily defeat certification 
of the entire class . . . .”246 “[A] flaw that may defeat 
predominance [would be] the existence of large numbers of class 
members who were never exposed to the challenged conduct to 
begin with.”247 As “the district court is well situated to winnow 
out those non-injured members,”248 the Torres court affirmed 
class certification.249 
As reflected by these decisions post-Comcast, the de 
minimis exception has not been expressly adopted by many of 
 
 239. See id. (“For the sake of argument, we assume that the district court 
correctly recognized a de minimis exception to the general rule 
that . . . causation and injury must be ‘capable of class-wide resolution.’” 
(citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011))). 
 240. Id. at 625. 
 241. Id. at 625–26. 
 242. See id. at 627 (declining to create “the first such case” in which 
“thousands of class members testify”). 
 243. 835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 244. See id. at 1136–37 (allowing certification despite “the possibility that 
an injurious course of conduct may sometimes fail to cause injury to certain 
class members”). 
 245. Id. at 1137. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1136 (emphasis in original). 
 248. Id. at 1137. 
 249. Id. at 1142. 
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courts. This is largely due to the fact that many courts 
previously followed the less rigorous “widespread impact” test, 
which of course had no reason (or need) for a de minimis 
exception as it is built into the “widespread impact” test.250 De 
minimis was encapsulated by the notion that only “a great 
many” uninjured class members would preclude class 
certification.251 It is only now that the more rigorous “common 
proof” test dominates that a de minimis exception is relevant.252 
However, despite its unclear status currently, it is likely that 
the de minimis exception will be adopted by courts that apply 
the “common proof” test as there are clear benefits that the 
exception grants a court engaging in the rigorous analysis 
demanded in the post-Walmart era.253 Similarly, the courts that 
had previously favored the less stringent “widespread” test will 
clearly favor the de minimis exception as it fits their previous 
jurisprudence better than demanding 100% of class members to 
prove injury on a common basis.254 Consequently, the de 
minimis exception will become the norm circuit-wide when 
assessing predominance in the context of antitrust injury. 
C. What is Considered De Minimis? 
Although the de minimis exception will likely be adopted 
across the board, the question still remains as to how many 
uninjured members is too many? In other words, how must a 
 
 250. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 135 (D.D.C. 2017) (recognizing that the “all or virtually 
all” standard and the “de minimis” standard as “two sides of the same coin”). 
 251. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 
825 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] class should not be certified if it is apparent that it 
contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of the 
defendant.”). 
 252. See Rail Freight II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 134 (sifting through the 
relevant post-Comcast case law to determine whether a de minimis exception 
is necessary to be included in the analysis); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge 
Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight III), 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
(recognizing that the de minimis exception would not require “common 
evidence of injury to all class members”). 
 253. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(noting the “obvious utility” and “efficiency” of the de minimis exception). 
 254. See Rail Freight II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 134 (analyzing the effects of 
the de minimis exception in the context of “widespread impact”). 
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court measure the quantity of problematic class members in 
order to determine whether the exception is satisfied? What are 
the limits of the de minimis exception?255 Most courts 
recognizing the exception are hesitant to place a hard, clear 
outer bound on the exception.256 
However, a few principles become apparent in reading 
discussions of the de minimis exception. First, the application of 
the de minimis exception must be structured in the context of 
the “common proof” standard and the predominance inquiry.257 
Courts look to various factors as relevant to determining 
whether the number of uninjured members is de minimis or 
instead would frustrate predominance.258 Second, a “winnowing 
mechanism” used to determine which putative class members 
fall in the de minimis uninjured group is required.259 
Importantly, this “winnowing mechanism” must be protective of 
defendant’s Seventh Amendment and Due Process rights.260 
Primarily, what qualifies as a de minimis deviation “from a 
prescribed standard must, of course, be determined with 
reference to the purpose of the standard.”261 Thus, the de 
minimis exception to the “common proof” standard must be 
 
 255. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (“[W]hen does the need for 
individualized proof of injury and causation destroy predominance?”). 
 256. See id. (rejecting the approach of some courts which “arbitrarily 
imposed a six-percent upper limit on the percentage of uninjured parties who 
may be included in a certified class”). 
 257. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 30–31 (emphasizing the role of predominance 
in construing the de minimis exception). 
 258. See Rail Freight II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 135–38 (analyzing whether the 
amount of uninjured class members in the matter was encompassed by the de 
minimis exception). 
 259. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 19 (“At the class certification stage, the court 
must be satisfied that, prior to judgment, it will be possible to establish a 
mechanism for distinguishing the injured from the uninjured.”). 
 260. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[A] 
class may be certified notwithstanding the need to adjudicate individual issues 
so long as the proposed adjudication will be both administratively feasible and 
protective of defendants’ Seventh Amendment and Due Process rights.”). 
 261. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 232 
(1992). 
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structured with the predominance inquiry in mind.262 If an 
amount of uninjured class members is to be considered de 
minimis, the issues “common to [the] class” must still 
“predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members.”263 Accordingly, the number of uninjured members 
must not be large enough to “render the class impractical or 
improper, or to cause noncommon issues to predominate.”264 If 
the putatively de minimis uninjured class members truly do not 
frustrate predominance then “the addition or subtraction of any 
of the plaintiffs to or from the class [should not] have a 
substantial effect on the substance or quantity of evidence 
offered.”265 
In following this principle, courts look to various factors 
when determining whether any number of uninjured class 
members can be considered de minimis.266 Assessing each 
factor, the district court seeks to determine whether the 
presence of the uninjured class members would defeat 
predominance.267 First, although no court has adopted a hard 
and fast rule of percentages, the district courts that have found 
the de minimis exception satisfied suggest that 6 percent 
represents the upper bound of the de minimis exception.268 
Multiple courts have denied certification to classes with 
 
 262. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 626 (determining whether an amount 
of uninjured class members was de minimis in light of the predominance 
inquiry). 
 263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 264. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 31 (1st Cir. 2015); see 
Asacol, 907 F.3d at 51 (“The aim of the predominance inquiry is to test whether 
any dissimilarity among the claims of class members can be dealt with in a 
manner that is not inefficient or unfair.”). 
 265. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 30 (quoting Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 
1256, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009)). 
 266. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
II), 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 135–40 (D.D.C. 2017) (looking to multiple factors to 
determine whether the number of uninjured class members was de minimis). 
 267. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 31 (asking whether the number of uninjured 
class members causes “non-common issues to predominate”). 
 268. See In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521, 2017 WL 
679367, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding the three uninjured class members de 
minimis in comparison (5.5 percent) to the class size of fifty-five); Rail Freight 
II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 137 (noting that the few decisions “suggest that 5% to 
6% constitutes the outer limits of a de minimis” exception). 
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uninjured members that account for more than this 
percentage.269 Second, in addition to percentages, courts also 
look to the raw number of uninjured class members.270 Thus far, 
only classes containing uninjured members amounting to single 
digits have ever achieved certification under the de minimis 
exception.271 
Finally, even apart from determining whether the actual 
number of uninjured members is de minimis or not, courts must 
also determine whether the uninjured members can be 
identified and severed from the rest of the class members.272 
This is necessary as the class members uninjured by the 
defendant’s antitrust violation cannot recover monetary 
damages.273 Multiple courts have struggled to find an effective 
method of distinguishing between the uninjured and injured 
members.274 The decision rests on balancing an 
“administratively feasible” method with the Seventh 
 
 269. See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
III), 934 F.3d 619, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding that a number of uninjured 
members constituting 12.7 percent of the class precluded a finding of 
predominance); Asacol, 907 F.3d at 50–52 (finding that a number of uninjured 
members constituting approximately 10 percent of the class to preclude a 
finding of predominance). 
 270. See Rail Freight II, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 137 (“Beyond percentages, the 
number of uninjured class members in relationship to the size of the class also 
may matter.”). 
 271. See Lidoderm, 2017 WL 679367, at *12 (finding three uninjured class 
members to be de minimis). 
 272. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 19 (“At the class certification stage, the court 
must be satisfied that, prior to judgment, it will be possible to establish a 
mechanism for distinguishing the injured from the uninjured class 
members.”). 
 273. See id. (“[T]he payout of the amount for which the defendants were 
held liable must be limited to injured parties.”); Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 
623 (“To establish liability under [the Clayton Act], each plaintiff must prove 
not only an antitrust violation, but also an injury to its business or property 
as a casual relation between the two.”). 
 274. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(noting the need to find a “winnowing mechanism”); Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d 
at 625 (determining whether an adequate “winnowing mechanism” existed 
such that class certification would not be precluded). 
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Amendment and Due Process rights of the defendants.275 No 
decision to date illustrates what kind of method would be 
acceptable based on these considerations.276 However, the First 
Circuit has discussed the matter and articulated the relevant 
factors of administrative feasibility and consciousness of 
Seventh Amendment and Due Process concerns.277 
In its decision in the Nexium Antitrust Litigation, the First 
Circuit recognized that unrebutted affidavits filed by members 
of the plaintiff class could serve as a feasible method of 
separating the injured from uninjured.278 There, AstraZeneca, 
the producer of Nexium, allegedly entered into noncompete 
agreements with three generic drug companies forestalling 
their marketing of generic forms of Nexium.279 The putative 
class alleged that this anticompetitive behavior harmed the 
class by frustrating the production of a generic alternative, thus 
raising prices.280 However, it was made clear through expert 
testimony that some percentage of the putative class members 
were not injured by the conspiracy because they would not have 
switched to the generic drug even if it had been available.281 
As stated above, despite the presence of possibly uninjured 
class members the district court certified the plaintiff class.282 
Essential to certification was the existence of a “winnowing 
 
 275. See Asacol, 907 F.3d at 52 (“[A] class may be certified notwithstanding 
the need to adjudicate individual issues so long as the proposed adjudication 
will be both administratively feasible and protective of defendants’ Seventh 
Amendment and Due Process rights.”). 
 276. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 625 (rejecting rebuttable affidavits 
as an acceptable “winnowing mechanism” and discussing the standard a 
possible mechanism must satisfy). 
 277. Asacol, 907 F.3d at 52. 
 278. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[I]f 
such consumer testimony would be sufficient to establish injury in an 
individual suit, it follows that similar testimony in the form of an affidavit or 
declaration would be sufficient in a class action.”). 
 279. Id. at 14. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 17. 
 282. See id. (“The district court below concluded that plaintiffs had 
sufficiently demonstrated a showing of adequacy of representation and 
predominance of common questions to the class to meet the requirements of 
class certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3).”). 
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mechanism” suggested by the plaintiffs in order to determine 
which putative class members were uninjured.283 Affirming the 
lower court,284 the Nexium court stated clearly that “[t]he court 
may proceed with certification so long as [the winnowing] 
mechanism will be administratively feasible, and protective of 
defendants’ Seventh Amendment and due process rights.”285 
The First Circuit found that the winnowing mechanism of 
unrebutted affidavits by each class members was sufficient.286 
Four years later, the First Circuit sharply limited the 
Nexium decision in the Asacol Antitrust Litigation.287 Asacol 
presented a similar yet slightly distinct factual scenario.288 In 
Asacol a putative class of plaintiffs sued a pharmaceutical 
company alleging that the company engaged in anticompetitive 
“product hopping.”289 “Product hopping” occurs when a 
pharmaceutical company switches out a popular brand-name 
product with a short patent-life for a substantially similar 
brand-name product with a long patent-life remaining.290 This 
technique frustrates producers of generic products because a 
“reference brand name drug” is required for a generic to be 
introduced into the market.291 However, similar to Nexium, it 
was revealed by expert testimony that over 10 percent of the 
class members were likely uninjured by the defendant’s 
 
 283. Id. at 19. 
 284. Id. at 32 (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying 
the [putative] class of plaintiffs.”). 
 285. Id. at 19. 
 286. See id. at 21 (“[W]e have confidence that a mechanism would exist for 
establishing injury at the liability stage of this case, compliant with the 
requirements of the Seventh Amendment and due process.” (citing Madison v. 
Chalmette Refining, LLC, 637 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2011))). 
 287. In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 288. Id. at 45–47. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See id. at 46 (“[B]y pulling Asacol, [the pharmaceutical company] 
effectively prevented generic drugs that would have used Asacol as a reference 
drug from entering the market after the expiration of Asacol’s patents.”). 
 291. See id. (“[Defendant’s] aim in pulling Asacol from the market and 
introducing Delzicol was to preclude the possibility of market entry of generic 
drugs . . . .”). 
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behavior because they would not have switched to a generic 
alternative even if the “product hopping” had not occurred.292 
In contrast to its decision in Nexium, the First Circuit held 
that unrebutted affidavits did not satisfy the two conditions 
required for establishing a winnowing mechanism.293 The court 
emphasized that class certification could not ignore the basic 
and foundational principles contained in Due Process and the 
Seventh Amendment.294 The Asacol court made clear, “the 
district court must at the time of certification offer a reasonable 
and workable plan for how that opportunity will be provided in 
a manner that is protective of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights and does not cause individual inquiries to overwhelm 
common issues.”295 The plaintiff’s attempt to use affidavits as a 
winnowing mechanism was sharply rejected.296 The court looked 
to the fact that, unlike in Nexium, the defendant in Asacol 
sought to challenge the affidavits, thus requiring “individual 
trials because genuinely contested affidavits do not support 
summary judgment and are inadmissible.”297 There, the court 
made abundantly clear that it was not willing to sacrifice the 
defendant’s substantive rights for the sake of certifying the 
putative class.298 
 
 292. See id. at 47 (recounting that the district court presumed that “by the 
end of the relevant period, somewhere around 10% of the class members would 
have opted for [the brand name drug] even in the presence of [the generic]”). 
 293. See id. at 53 (“A claims administrator’s review of contested forms 
completed by consumers concerning an element of their claims would fail to be 
protective of defendants’ Seventh Amendment and due process rights.”). 
 294. See id. (“The fact that plaintiffs seek class certification provides no 
occasion for jettisoning the rules of evidence and procedure, the Seventh 
Amendment, or the dictate of the Rules Enabling Act . . . .” (citing Tyson 
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016))). 
 295. Id. at 58; see id. at 55 (“Whether that opportunity precludes class 
certification turns on whether such challenges are reasonably plausible in a 
given case and whether the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that allowing for such 
challenges in a manner that protects the defendant’s rights will be 
manageable and superior to the alternatives.”). 
 296. See id. at 58 (finding that the “plaintiffs ha[d] plainly not enabled the 
district court to articulate” a plan that would satisfy the court’s requirements). 
 297. Id. 
 298. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(recognizing that the court has “no license to create a Rule 23(b)(3) class in 
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VI. Conclusion 
Effective enforcement of the federal antitrust laws is key to 
protecting the United States free market.299 Absent a purposeful 
deterrent, potential market power abusers will remain 
unfettered in their actions, resulting in long-term negative 
effects on the American economy.300 The goals of the Sherman 
Act simply cannot be achieved without the proper functioning of 
every aspect of antitrust enforcement. Accordingly, the “private 
attorneys general,”301 must be able to efficiently bring claims 
against and challenge the resources of the powerful goliaths 
that frequently commit antitrust violations.302 The class action 
mechanism serves to empower the antitrust plaintiff by 
allowing the large-scale aggregation of what normally amounts 
to relatively small individual claims.303 
We have yet to witness the full effects of the Supreme 
Court’s post-Wal-Mart jurisprudence, though it is clear that the 
days of “certify now, ask questions later,” are over.304 A putative 
 
every negative value case by either altering or reallocating substantive claims 
or departing from the rules of evidence”). 
 299. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977) (recognizing 
the goal of “deterring violators and depriving them of the fruits of their 
illegality” reflected in the antitrust laws); N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. 
FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 502 (2015) (“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard 
for the Nation’s free market structure.”). 
 300. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56–57 (1911) 
(discussing fears that monopoly would “restrain the free flow of commerce and 
tend to bring about the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were 
considered to be against public policy”). 
 301. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). 
 302. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746 (“[T]he legislative purpose in 
creating a group of ‘private attorneys general’ to enforce the antitrust laws.” 
(quoting Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 262)). 
 303. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 23 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting 
the purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) as the “vindication of the rights of groups of people 
who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents 
to court at all”); California v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701–02 (1979) (“[T]he 
Rule 23 class-action device was designed to allow an exception to the usual 
rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named 
parties only.”). 
 304. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“Rule 
23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.”); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 
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class of antitrust plaintiffs must “affirmatively demonstrate” 
that its method of proving class-wide injury meets the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).305 It is not enough that the 
plaintiffs establish “widespread impact” to the class, as now 
“common proof” of injury as to the entire class is required.306 But 
even under this more stringent standard, it is impractical for 
courts to require 100 percent of the class members to prove 
injury at the class certification stage.307 Consequently, the de 
minimis exception will function as an escape hatch to allow 
certification when the number of potentially uninjured class 
members does not frustrate predominance.308 So long as 
common questions continue to predominate over individualized 
ones, the presence of a de minimis amount of uninjured class 
members will not preclude certification.309 Further, it is key that 
the “winnowing mechanism” used to sever uninjured class 
 
569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (“[I]t may be necessary for the court to probe behind the 
pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question . . . .”). 
 305. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (“A party seeking class certification 
must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule . . . .”); Comcast, 
569 U.S. at 33 (requiring the party to “affirmatively demonstrate” compliance 
with Rule 23); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (Rail Freight 
III), 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (requiring “common affirmative 
evidence . . . that a conspiracy did in fact injure” the class members). 
 306. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 623 (“Without common proof of injury 
and causation, section 4 plaintiffs cannot establish predominance.” (citing 
Comcast, 569 U.S. at 36–38)). 
 307. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22 (“[I]t is simply not possible to entirely 
separate the injured from the uninjured at the class certification stage.”); Pella 
Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (“While it is almost 
inevitable that a class will include some people who have not been injured by 
the defendant’s conduct because at the outset of the case many members may 
be unknown . . . this possibility does not preclude class certification.”). 
 308. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 624 (questioning whether “common 
proof covering virtually all members of the proposed class, and leaving only a 
de minimis number of cases requiring individualized proof of injury . . . would 
be enough to show predominance”); Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, 
Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 232 (1992) (stating that a de minimis deviation “from a 
prescribed standard must, of course, be determined with reference to the 
purpose of the standard”). 
 309. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 30 (“[I]f common issues truly predominate 
over individualized issues in a lawsuit, then the addition or subtraction of any 
of the plaintiffs to or from the class [should not] have a substantial effect on 
substance or quantity of evidence offered.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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members be “administratively feasible” and protective of the 
defendant’s Seventh Amendment and Due Process rights. 
The “common proof” standard combined with the de 
minimis exception strikes an important balance between the 
goals of Wal-Mart’s “rigorous analysis” and the goals of antitrust 
enforcement. While the “common proof” standard allows courts 
to fully engage with the plaintiffs’ method of proving class-wide 
injury,310 the de minimis exception provides for certification in 
the cases most essential to private antitrust enforcement: 
instances of relatively minute injuries spread over a large 
number of individuals.311 Adhering to this balance through 
proper administration of the de minimis exception will solve the 
uncertainty currently plaguing the antitrust class action bar. In 
turn, the “private attorneys general,” tasked with aiding in 
antitrust enforcement, will truly be able to fulfill their role in 
protecting the free market of the United States. 
 
 
 310. See Rail Freight III, 934 F.3d at 626 (“[C]onfronting such questions is 
part-and-parcel of the ‘hard look’ required by Wal-Mart and Comcast . . . .”). 
 311. See Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22 (“[T]he Advisory Committee sought to 
cover cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and 
expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly 
situation.” (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997))). 
